Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

State of Utah v. Randy Peter Krukowski : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stephen R. McCaughey; attorney for appellee.
Jeffrey S. Gray, Brenda J. Beaton; assistants attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general;
attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Krukowski, No. 20010585 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3385

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20010585-CA

vs.
RANDY PETER KRUKOWSKI,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.
— i

-

.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING THE INFORMATION
CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH ENGAGING IN A CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY OPERATION, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37D-4(l) (1998), AND
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OR
COUNTERFEIT SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, A FIRST
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(1)(A)(III) (SUPP. 1999), IN THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT
LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852
BRENDA J. BEATON, Bar No. 6832
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
10 West Broadway, Ste. 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Appellee

FILED
Utah Court of A p p ^

Attorneys for Appellant
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED—

MRMaua

PaUtett 'Star™
Clerk of the cZrt

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20010585-CA

vs.
Priority No. 2

RANDY PETER KRUKOWSKI,
Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM AN ORDER DISMISSING THE INFORMATION
CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH ENGAGING IN A CLANDESTINE
LABORATORY OPERATION, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37D-4(l) (1998), AND
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OR
COUNTERFEIT SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, A FIRST
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(1)(A)(III) (SUPP. 1999), IN THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH, SALT
LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852
BRENDA J. BEATON, Bar No. 6832
Assistant Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
10 West Broadway, Ste. 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Appellee

Attorneys for Appellant
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

-±
...

-iii-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

i

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

i

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

..2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

Summary of Proceedings Below

3

Summary of Facts

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

..'..'

ARGUMENT

6
6

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO A DULY EXECUTED
SEARCH WARRANT

6

I.

MURRAY AND THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE DOCTRINE

7

II.

THE EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED FROM AN INDEPENDENT
SOURCE AND SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED

9

A.

THE OFFICER'S DECISION TO SEEK A SEARCH WARRANT WAS
NOT PROMPTED BY HIS OBSERVATION OF THE CLANDESTINE LAB
DURING THE UNLAWFUL ENTRY

9

1. The Trial Court Misconstrued the Holding in Murray and
Improperly Extended It Under the Franks Doctrine, Thus
Resulting in a Clearly Erroneous Finding

12

a) Murray Does Not Require Disclosure of a Prior Police Entry
for a Magistrate's Review

12

-i-

b) Failure to Disclose a Prior Police Entry Does Not Constitute
a Material Omission Under Franks

14
i

c) Officer McNaughton 's Prior Entry Into the Storage Shed Was
Not Material to a Probable Cause Determination

B.

17

2. The Trial Court Improperly Premised Its Finding on the Illegality
of the Initial Entry

22

No INFORMATION FROM THE INITIAL ENTRY WAS RELIED ON IN THE
MAGISTRATE'S DECISION TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANT

26

i

,<

CONCLUSION

27

ADDENDA
Addendum A ("Memorandum Decision" re: motion to suppress)

<

Addendum B ("Memorandum Decision" re: objection to findings and conclusions)
Addendum C ("Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting Motion to Suppress")
Addendum D ("Affidavit for Search Warrant")

(

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE AUTHORITY
FEDERAL CASES

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978)

...

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983)

12, 15, 20
15

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S.Ct. 2529 (1988) . . 7-10, l i , 15, 23, 26, 27
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984)

8, 23

Technical Ordnance, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2001),
cert, denied, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 819 (2002)

16

United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687 (11th Cir.), cert, denied,
528 U.S. 1048, 120 S.Ct. 585 (1999)

20

United States v. Dick, 173 F.Supp.2d 765 (E.D. Tenn. 2001)

25

United States v. D 'Armond, 80 F.Supp.2d 1157 (D. Kan. 1999)

25

United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir.), cert, denied,
444 U.S. 848, 100 S.Ct. 97 (1979)

25

United States v. Hogan, 38 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 1994), cert, denied,
514 U.S. 1008, 115 S.Ct. 1323 (1995)

21

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (1984)

2j)

United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900 (7th Cir.), cert, denied,
531 U.S. 891,121 S.Ct. 217 (2000)

9,10,26

United States v. Perez, — F.3d —, Nos. 00-5237, 00-5238, 00-5261,
2002 WL 171241 (3rd Cir. Feb. 4, 2002)

20

United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1992), cert, denied,
506 U.S. 1049, 113 S.Ct. 968 (1993)

20

-in-

United States v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied,
487 U.S. 1263, 109 S.Ct. 25 (1988)

23

United States v. Shamaeizadeh, 80 F.3d 1131 (6th Cir. 1996)

20

United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (1st Cir. 1986)

..8
(

••

United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458 (10th Cir.1990)

20

United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.1983), cert, denied,
465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1593(1984)

25
i

STATE CASES

State v. Doyle, 918 P.2d 141 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996)
State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, 37 P.3d 1197

. ...

-18,19
2,14

State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108

2,10, 24

State v. Hansen, 112 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987)

18,12

State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 20 P.3d 342

K)

State v. Mecham, 23 Utah 2d 18, 456 P.2d 156 (Utah 1969)
State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996))

{

i

JO, U

2
1

State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah), cert, denied,
480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1565 (1987)
Statev. Norris,200\ UT 104, 436 Utah Adv. Rep 27
State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988)
Statev. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

15-17,21
11
8, 23
2
i

State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993)

16

-ivi

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)

12,19

State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270

25

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998)

. . . . . . . . . K)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const, amend. IV

•

2

STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1999)

I

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1998)

i

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1996)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996)

I

Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-17.5 (Supp. 1997)

14

-v-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 20010585-CA

vs.
RANDY PETER KRUKOWSKI,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals from an order dismissing the information charging defendant with
engaging in a clandestine laboratory operation, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l) (1998), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance or
counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 1999). The dismissal resulted from the trial court's order
granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court err in suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant
based on the affiant's failure to advise the magistrate of a previous warrantless entry into the
searched premises?

.

.-

"

•

'

. 1 -

Presentation of the Issue. The issue here was preserved in the State's Objection to
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, R. 81-100, its Response to Defense's Supplemental
Memorandum, R. 125-132, and at the hearing on the motion to suppress, R. 195.
Standard ofReview. "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910
P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.) {citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994), cert,
denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996)). When challenging a trial court's findings, the appellant
"must first marshal all of the evidence that supports the trial court's findings" and then
"show that, even when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44, f 17 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1108 (emphasis in original); accord State v. Galvan, 2001 UT
App 329,16, 37 P.3d 1197.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, reproduced below, is
relevant to a determination of this case.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Based on evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, defendant was charged with
engaging in a clandestine laboratory operation and unlawful possession of a controlled
substance or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute, both first degree felonies. R. 2-4.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. R. 49-78. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court granted defendant's motion and ordered that the evidence be suppressed. R. 113,
134-45, 174-80.! Because the State could not proceed absent the evidence, the charges were
dismissed on the State's motion. R. 181-83. The State timely appealed. R. 184-87. The
case was thereafter transferred to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996).
R. 193.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

Officers Keith Olson and Ken Ouellette received information from two confidential
informants that a man named "Randy Kawalski" was manufacturing methamphetamine in
unit 16 of Midvale Self Storage. R. 162-63; R. 195: 4-6, 9. Based on that information,
Officer Michael McNaughton of the Metro Narcotics Task Force drove to the storage shed
facility just after 4 o'clock p.m. R. 195: 4-7. Upon arrival, Officer McNaughton observed

'The memorandum decision granting the motion to suppress, R. 134-45, is
reproduced in Addendum A.
The State objected to defendant's proposed findings and conclusions. R. 154-66.
The memorandum decision ruling on those objections, R. 167-73, is reproduced in
Addendum B.
The "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting Motion to Suppress"
entered by the trial court, R. 174-80, is reproduced in Addendum C.
3

a pickup truck, registered to defendant Randy Krukowski, parked directly in front of unit 16.
R. 195: 5. The overhead, garage-type door was closed, but the adjoining hinged door leading
into the storage shed was open a couple of inches. R. 195: 6, 16. Officer McNaughton
requested that a K-9 unit report to the site. R. 195: 6. Shortly after the K-9 unit arrived,

M
Officers Olsen and Ouellette also arrived on the scene. R. 195: 9.
Officer McNaughton asked the dog handler to check units 15 through 18. R. 195: 7-8,

^1
\

16. Neither Officer McNaughton nor the other officers on the scene told the dog handler
which unit they suspected housed the lab. R. 195: 9-10. The dog picked up the scent of
narcotics in front of unit 15, but based on the direction of the wind and the handler's training

<

and experience, the handler identified unit 16 as the site where the narcotics were located.
R. 195:8, 17-18.
' i

Officer McNaughton testified that although he believed probable cause existed to
obtain a search warrant, he did not immediately seek a warrant because he believed that
someone was inside the unit. R. 195: 12, 19. Instead, Officer McNaughton knocked on the
partially-open door of unit 16. R. 195: 10, 12. Defendant answered the door, stepped
outside, and closed the door behind him. R. 195: 10. Officer McNaughton identified himself

^

and advised defendant that police had information that there was a "drug problem" in the
storage facility. R. 195: 12. Defendant denied any drug problem there. R. 195: 13.
i
Officer McNaughton then asked defendant for permission to go inside the storage
shed to check. R. 195: 13. Defendant asked if the officers had a search warrant. R. 195: 13.
When Officer McNaughton told defendant that they did not have a warrant, defendant
4

<

refused to consent to a search. R. 195: 13. Notwithstanding defendant's refusal, Officer
McNaughton and another officer entered the storage shed.

R. 195: 13-14.

Officer

McNaughton testified that he entered the storage shed because he was concerned that others
might be inside the shed, that the chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine
posed a safety risk, and that those chemicals might be disposed of in an unsafe manner. R.
195: 13-15,22-23. Upon entering, the officers saw a methamphetamine lab, but did not see
any other people inside the premises. R. 195: 14. Upon verifying that no one was else was
present, the officers immediately exited the premises. R. 195: 14. After exiting the storage
shed, Officer McNaughton left to obtain a search warrant, leaving defendant with the other
officers. R. 195: 14,22-23.
Officer McNaughton prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant, and after
he submitted it to a magistrate for review, a warrant was issued authorizing the search of unit
16. R. 195: 20.2 Officer McNaughton did not advise the magistrate that he had already
entered the storage shed and seen a methamphetamine laboratory. R. 195: 21. Officer
McNaughton testified that he did not so inform the magistrate because he was not relying on
that information as part of his probable cause showing. R. 195: 21-22. After securing the
search warrant, officers searched unit 16, seized the contraband, and arrested defendant. See
R. 195:21.

2

The "Affidavit for Search Warrant," R. 160-66, is reproduced in Addendum D.
Details of the affidavit are discussed in the body of the brief.
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's finding that Officer McNaughton initially entered the storage shed
not for safety reasons, but to satisfy himself that a search warrant would yield the seizure of
a methamphetamine lab, was clearly erroneous. The trial court based its finding on the
erroneous legal conclusion that whenever an officer seeking a search warrant has already
entered the premises to be searched, he or she must disclose that fact to the magistrate in the
search warrant affidavit. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the United States Supreme
Court has not compelled that disclosure and failure to include such information does not
necessarily constitute an omission that is material to the probable cause finding. Because the
trial court's rejection of Officer McNaughton's testimony is premised on its misconception
of the law, its finding is clearly erroneous. The court also unduly focused on the illegality
of the initial, presumably unlawful entry. In doing so, the trial court improperly ignored the
evidence supporting the officer's concerns for safety and imposed a remedy disproportionate
to the harm.

Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting

defendant's motion to suppress.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO A DULY EXECUTED
SEARCH WARRANT
The sole issue before the Court is whether the trial court erred in suppressing evidence
obtained pursuant to a search warrant on the ground officers had made a prior, presumptively
unlawful entry and had failed to so notify the magistrate when seeking the warrant.

' •

6

'"

.

I.
MURRAY AND THE INDEPENDENT SOURCE DOCTRINE
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S.Ct. 2529 (1988), governs this case.3 In
Murray, federal law enforcement agents lawfully stopped and seized two vehicles which both
contained marijuana. 487 U.S. at 535, 108 S.Ct. at 2532. Agents seized the vehicles after
observing them enter and subsequently leave a warehouse while under surveillance in a drug
trafficking investigation. Id. After the vehicle searches uncovered the marijuana, agents
converged on the warehouse and forced entry without a warrant. Id. Agents found no one
inside, but saw in plain view a large number of wrapped bales later found to contain
marijuana. Id. The agents exited without disturbing the bales, placed the warehouse under
surveillance, and secured a search warrant. Id. "In applying for the warrant, the agents did
not mention the prior warrantless entry, and did not rely on any observations made during
that entry." Id. at 535-36,108 S.Ct. at 2532. After securing the warrant, agents searched the
warehouse and seized 270 bales of marijuana. Id. at 487 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 2532.
In upholding the second search, the Supreme Court relied on the "independent source"
doctrine, which, the Court explained, is traditionally "applied in the exclusionary rule context
. . . with reference to that category of evidence acquired by an untainted search which is

3

The trial court concluded that Murray does not apply to the facts of this case. R.
179, at Tf 11. The trial court attempted to distinguish Murray from this case, explaining
that Murray says nothing about how the validity of a warrant is undermined by a failure to
disclose a prior warrantless entry. See R. 140-43. The trial court's conclusion is
incorrect. As in Murray, the officers here "did not mention the prior warrantless entry" in
applying for the warrant. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 535-36, 108 S.Ct. at 2532. As
explained hereafter, Murray's analysis applies.
7

identical to the evidence unlawfully acquired'." Id. at537-38, 108 S.Ct. at 2533-34 (emphasis
in original). Under the doctrine, evidence discovered through an unlawful search is
considered to be untainted if it is later obtained from activities independent of the prior
illegality. Id, 537-39, 108 S.Ct. at 2533-34 (quoting United States v. &7ves/n, 787 F.2d736,
739 (1st Cir. 1986)). Murray explained the rationale underlying the doctrine as follows:
"The interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public
interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly
balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they
would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. . . . When
the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence
would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent
any error or violation."
Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. at 2533 (quotingNix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,443, 104
S.Ct. 2501,2509 (1984)) (emphasis in original). One month before Murray, this Court came
to the same conclusion, holding "that evidence which is in plain view during an illegal entry
and later seized pursuant to a valid warrant based upon independent information, may be
admissible under either the 'independent source' or the 'inevitable discovery' doctrine."
State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah App. 1988).4
In Murray, the petitioner complained that application of the doctrine would encourage

<

officers to first make a warrantless entry to verify their suspicions before seeking a warrant.
Id. at 539, 108 S.Ct. at 2534. The Court observed that such a practice would be not be wise
4

The Supreme Court in Murray observed that "[t]he inevitable discovery doctrine,
with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source
doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an
independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered."
487 U.S. at 539, 108 S.Ct. at 2534 (emphasis in original).
8
(

because the officer uwould risk suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and
unseen, since his action would add to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there
is probable cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no
information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officer's
decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant it. Id. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at
2534. Thus, where an unlawful entry precedes a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, the
evidence is not subject to suppression so long as the State demonstrates to the trial court that
(1) the officer's decision to seek the warrant was not prompted by what was seen or seized
during the unlawful entry, and (2) the information obtained from the unlawful entry did not
impact the magistrate's decision to issue the search warrant. See id.; accord United States
v. May, 214 F.3d 900,906 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 891,121 S.Ct. 217 (2000). If the
State satisfies both prongs, the subsequently seized evidence is not suppressed under the
exclusionary rule.
II.

THE EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED FROM AN INDEPENDENT
SOURCE AND SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED.
Applying the independent source doctrine as articulated in Murray to the facts here,
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant should not have been suppressed.
A.

THE OFFICER'S DECISION TO SEEK A SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT PROMPTED
BY HIS OBSERVATION OF THE CLANDESTINE LAB DURING THE UNLAWFUL
ENTRY.

The first inquiry under Murray, and the basis of the court's ruling below, is whether
Officer McNaughton's decision to seek the warrant was prompted by his observation of the
9

methamphetamine lab during the prior entry. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at
2534, May, 214 F.3d at 906. The trial court found that Officer McNaughton "would not have
sought a search warrant but for his illegal observations of the inside of the storage area/' R.
177, at f 6, see also R. 179, at ff 13-14. The court discounted Officer McNaughton's
i

testimony that he entered the shed for safety reasons, finding instead that he "entered the
storage shed initially [ ] to investigate the case further before deciding whether to seek a
warrant." R. 179, at If 13.
Because of the trial court's advantaged position in assessing credibility, these findings
are accorded deference and thus will only be set aside upon a showing of clear error. See

\

State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, f 45, 20 P.3d 342. Clear error will be found where "the trial
court's findings so lack support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence'". State
i

v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, at % 17 n. 2,1 P.3d 1108 (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305, 312 (Utah 1998)) (other internal quotes and citations omitted). However, clear error
will also be found if the trial court operated under "a misconception of the law with respect
to which a correct view would have produced a different result." See State v. Mecham, 23
Utah 2d 18, 21, 456 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1969). That was the case here.

<

The trial court offered two reasons for discounting Officer McNaughton's testimony
and finding instead that he entered the storage shed "to satisfy himself that there was a basis
to go to the effort to obtain a search warrant." R. 169. First, the court rejected the officer's
explanation because he did not advise the magistrate of his initial entry into the storage shed
and of his resulting observation of the methamphetamine lab. R. 169-70. Second, the court
10

<

rejected the officer's explanation because the evidence did not justify a protective sweep of
the premises. R. 170; R. 178, at 1fl[ 7-9.
Marshaling the evidence that supports the trial court's finding, Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,
U 17 n. 2, the search warrant affidavit reveals that Officer McNaughton did not, in fact,
apprise the magistrate of his initial entry into the storage shed and observation of the
clandestine lab. See R. 160-66. Indeed, Officer McNaughton testified at the suppression
hearing that he considered including that information, but ultimately chose to withhold it.
R. 195: 21. It might thus be inferred, as the trial court did, that Officer McNaughton
concealed the initial entry from the magistrate for fear it would jeopardize the prospect of
securing a search warrant. See R. 169. Other evidence supporting the trial court's finding
includes Officer McNaughton's testimony that no evidence suggested other people were
inside the storage shed and that the shed did not have a back exit. R. 195: 22-23. Absent any
articulable threat to safety, it might be inferred, again as the trial court did, that Officer
McNaughton's safety explanation was no more than "an attempt to justify the search after
it was called into question." R. 170.
Notwithstanding the foregoing evidence, the trial court's finding constituted clear
error because it rested on the court's misinterpretation of the holding in Murray and its undue
emphasis on the presumed illegality of the initial entry. Had the court correctly interpreted
and applied the law, a different finding would have necessarily resulted. See Mecham, 23
Utah 2d at 21, 456 P.2d at 158.

U

1.

The Trial Court Misconstrued the Holding in Murray and
Improperly Extended It Under the Franks Doctrine, Thus Resulting
in a Clearly Erroneous Finding.

The overriding reason the trial court discounted Officer McNaughton's explanation
for making the initial, warrantless entry was Officer McNaughton's failure to so apprise the
magistrate of that entry and of his resulting observation of the clandestine lab. The court
explained:

.

Based upon the fact that Detective McNaughton did not advise [the
magistrate] of the fact that he had made an illegal entry into the
defendant's premises, and did in fact ascertain that there was drug
manufacturing in the defendant's premises when he was presenting
information to [the magistrate] for issuance of a warrant, this Court has
little confidence in the testimony of Detective McNaughton on this issue.
R. 169-70. This conclusion was based on the trial court's erroneous view that (1) the holding
i

in Murray requires an officer to include that information in a search warrant affidavit, and
(2) failure to do so constitutes a material omission under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978). As explained below, the trial court misconstrued these cases.
a)

<

Murray Does Not Require Disclosure of a Prior Police Entry for
a Magistrate's Review.

In its memorandum decision granting the motion to suppress, the trial court interpreted

{

Murray as "requiring] an officer to inform a magistrate of the prior illegal entry in order to
meet the heightened burden of convincing the magistrate that whatever was found during that
initial illegal entry was not used to establish probable cause." R. 142-43. The trial court
continued, explaining that "[a] magistrate who is not informed of the illegal entry would have
no way of making this assessment and would, in fact, be applying a lesser burden than

12

-••

'

i

required under Murray." R. 143. Contrary to the court's conclusion, Murray does not
require that police inform the magistrate of a prior entry in the search warrant affidavit.
In support of its conclusion that Murray requires disclosure in the affidavit of any
prior entry, the trial court points to Murray's holding that an officer who unlawfully enters
the premises before securing a search warrant "add[s] to the normal burden of convincing
a magistrate that there is probable cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial
court that no information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement
officers' decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant it." Murray, 487
U.S. at 540,108 S.Ct. at 2534-35 (emphasis added); seeR. 142. That holding, however, does
not stand for the proposition espoused by the trial court.
The court below confuses the respective roles of the magistrate and the trial court.
Murray does not indicate, as the trial court suggests, that the role of the magistrate includes
a determination of the effect of a prior, warrantless entry on the admissibility of evidence
later seized pursuant to a search warrant. Instead, the holding outlines the burdens of the
State, before both the magistrate and the trial court, in cases where a search warrant is
preceded by a warrantless entry. First, as in any undertaking to obtain a search warrant, the
government must meet "the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there improbable
causer

Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 2534 (emphasis added). Second, the

government must meet the added burden of "convincing a trial court that no information
gained from the illegal entry affected either [(1)] the law enforcement officer's decision to
seek a warrant[,] or [(2)] the magistrate's decision to grant it." Id (emphasis added).
13

Thus, contrary to the trial court's conclusion below, Murray does not require an
affiant to advise the magistrate of a prior warrantless entry to enable the magistrate to
determine the admissibility of the evidence in light of any prior entry. That determination
rests with the trial court. See Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (stating that "[preliminary questions

\

concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court"); cf. Galvan,
2001 UT App 329, at f 5 (stating standard of review for trial court's decision to grant or deny
motion to suppress). The magistrate's role is limited to determining probable cause. See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-17.5(1 )(c) (Supp. 1997) (granting magistrates authority to issue
(

search warrants).
b)

'

"

Failure to Disclose a Prior Police Entry Does Not Constitute a
Material Omission Under Franks.
"

.

•

"

.

"

'

.

<

Based on its mistaken view that Murray imposes a greater probable cause burden
whenever a prior entry has been made, the trial court concluded that a failure to apprise the
magistrate of that prior entry "amounts to a material omission under [the] Franks [doctrine]."

<

R. 143; see also R. 178. As explained above, the underlying premise of that conclusion is
wrong, and, as a result, the conclusion is invalid. Moreover, that conclusion is also incorrect
A

because it amounts to a per se rule of materiality. Franks and its progeny reject such a rule
of suppression.
Under the Franks doctrine, "a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to
challenge the validity of a search warrant if the defendant can establish that (i) an affiant in
an affidavit supporting a search warrant made a false statement intentionally, knowingly, or

;<
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with reckless disregard for the truth, and (ii) the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding
of probable cause after the misstatement is set aside." State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191
(Utah) {citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1565
(1987). The Franks doctrine also applies "when a misstatement occurs because information
is omitted." Id, Accordingly, "[i]f an affidavit fails to support a finding of probable cause
after the false statements are excised or the omitted information is added, i.e., if the omission
or misstatement materially affects the finding of probable cause, any evidence obtained under
the improperly issued warrant must be suppressed." Id,
As explained above, Murray did not alter the probable cause requirements for a search
warrant. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 2534 (requiring officers to satisfy "the
normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable cause" plus the burden of
"convincing a trial court" that issuance of the warrant was not affected by the information
gained from the unlawful entry). The standard of probable cause remains the same. The
search warrant affidavit must include sufficient information "to allow [the magistrate] to
determine probable cause." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2333
(1983). In other words, the officer must demonstrate that a substantial basis exists for
believing that evidence of illegal conduct will be found in the place described in the warrant.
See State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 16, 436 Utah Adv. Rep 27.
Certainly, an officer seeking a warrant must act in good faith. See Franks, 438 U.S.
at 164, 98 S.Ct. at 2681. The information included in a search warrant affidavit must be
"appropriately accepted by the affiant as true." Id. at 165, 98 S.Ct. at 2681. Likewise, the
15

affiant should include all material information that would properly affect a finding of
probable cause. See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. However, it need not include facts that are
immaterial to the probable cause finding. See Technical Ordnance, Inc. v. United States, 244
F.3d 641, 649 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that "[a] law enforcement official is not required to
include everything he knows about a subject in his affidavit"), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 122
S.Ct. 819(2002).
An officer's motivation for making an initial warrantless entry has no bearing on that
determination. Certainly, if information used in the affidavit originated from a prior entry,
those circumstances should be included. Likewise, if a prior entry uncovers information that
otherwise undercuts the probable cause showing in the affidavit, that information should also
be included. See State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956-57 (Utah App. 1993). Neither Murray
nor Franks requires more.
Moreover, the Franks doctrine is not a rule designed to exclude evidence. Under
Franks and its progeny, information omitted from a search warrant affidavit will not result
in the suppression of the evidence seized unless it is necessary to the probable cause finding.
See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. This is so because the very "purpose of Franks and its progeny
is to avoid suppressing evidence when the actual facts, if known to the magistrate, would
have resulted in a finding of probable cause." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even if Murray
had required disclosure, Franks would not necessarily require suppression.
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c)

Officer McNaughton 's Prior Entry Into the Storage Shed Was Not
Material to a Probable Cause Determination.

A review of the affidavit submitted to the magistrate reveals Officer McNaughton
submitted the appropriate information for probable cause determination." See State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1259-60 (Utah 1993) (holding that a warrant will be upheld so long
as there is "a 'substantial basis' for determining that probable cause existed").
According to the affidavit, officers received information from two confidential
informants—whose names, dates of birth, and addresses were known to police—that a man
identified as "Randy Kawalski" was operating a methamphetamine laboratory in unit 16 at
Midvale Self Storage. R. 162-63.6 The informants told officers that they had been in the
storage unit, observed the lab, and witnessed "Randy Kawalski" manufacturing
methamphetamine there. R. 163. The affidavit thus established that police had information
which, if true, established that within unit 16 were controlled substance precursors,
laboratory equipment, and supplies used in the operation of a clandestine laboratory.
The affidavit included information establishing the veracity of the two informants.
The affidavit indicated that both informants had provided police with a "substantial amount

5

Although the trial court had before it the "Affidavit for Search Warrant" at the
suppression hearing, see R. 195: 20, it only appears in the record as an attachment to the
State's Reply to Defendant's [Proposed] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, see R.
195: 154-66.
6

The informants' names were not disclosed in the affidavit "for fear of physical
retaliation." R. 165; cf. Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 193 (holding that "[a]s a matter of due
process, the identity of a confidential informant must be disclosed only when such
disclosure is 'essential to a fair determination of the issues'").
17

of drug trafficking and manufacturing intelligence'' subsequently verified as true and one
informant had provided information that led to the seizure of three clandestine
methamphetamine laboratories within the previous fifteen days. R. 165; see State v. Hansen,
732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (holding that informant's veracity may be established with
an indication that informant had previously given truthful information to police); State v.
Doyle, 918 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App.) (observing that "[t]he confidential informant's
corroboration was deemed to be reliable because this informant had provided the police with
reliable information in the past"), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). The affidavit also
noted that neither informant was a suspect in the investigation. R. 165.

<

Finally, the affidavit included information corroborating the informants' claims and
confirming that the methamphetamine lab was still in operation. The affidavit indicated that
<

Officer Kevin Hanson responded to the site with his dog Django, which was certified in
narcotics detection. R. 163-64. The affidavit indicated that Django trained in narcotics
detection with Officer Hanson four to five times each week, accumulating 700-800 hours of
narcotics training, and successfully found drugs in 38 of 98 searches in the past eight months
(including five of seven storage sheds). R. 164. Django walked by four storage sheds, but

<

was guided away from unit 16 because the door was slightly ajar. R. 163. The affidavit
indicated that Django hit on the area immediately south of unit 16, under the door of unit 15.
R. 163. Although the wind was blowing from the south toward the open door of unit 16,
Officer Hanson determined that based on his training and experience, "the wind was blowing
into the slightly open door of unit 16 and going into unit 16 then circling around to unit 15
18

J

where it was coming out from under the door." R. 163. This determination by Officer
Hanson was made even though he had not been advised of the lab's suspected location. R.
195: 9-10. The positive hit on unit 16 thus corroborated the informants' claims and
confirmed that the lab was still in operation. See Doyle, 918 P.2d at 144 (holding that police
search of trash uncovering evidence corroborated informant's claim).
Under these circumstances, including the established veracity of the informants and
the corroboration of their information, "there [was] a fair probability that the contraband
[would] be found in the place described." Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130.7 As such, a substantial
basis existed for the magistrate's determination that there was probable cause for the search
of unit 16. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1259-60.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Officer McNaughton's prior entry into the storage
shed and his observation of the clandestine lab would have added nothing to the magistrate's
probable cause review. As stated above, Officer McNaughton's motivation for first entering
the storage shed is immaterial to any probable cause determination. Even had the officer
entered for an impermissible reason, that in no way undercuts the information that supported
the probable cause finding. Moreover, a review of the affidavit reveals that none of the facts
described in the affidavit originated from the warrantless entry by Officer McNaughton. See
R. 160-66. As found by the trial court, "[t]he search warrant affidavit ma[de] no mention of

Other information in the affidavit also supported the probable cause finding. For
example, the affidavit indicated that Officer McNaughton confirmed that the person who
was presently in the storage shed bore a name remarkably similar to that provided by the
informants. R. 163 ("Randy Krukowski" rather than "Randy Kawalski").
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the unlawful entry by the police or of their havingfound the clandestine laboratory." R. 177
(emphasis added). Therefore, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, no reason existed to
include that information in the search warrant affidavit because it would not have materially
affected the probable cause finding.
Indeed, including that information would have in fact subjected the evidence to a
subsequent probable cause challenge under the Franks doctrine, which has been extended
to illegally obtained information. Six years after Franks, the United States Supreme Court
observed that if illegally obtained information is included in a search warrant affidavit, it will
"invalidate the warrant for the search . . . if it proved to be critical to establishing probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719, 104 S.Ct.
3296,3305 (1984) (emphasis added). However, citing Franks, the Supreme Court held that
"if sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the warrant affidavit to establish probable
cause, the warrant [is] nevertheless valid." Id (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 172, 98 S.Ct. at
2685); accord United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 1460 (10th Cir.1990). Thus, where a
magistrate issues a search warrant supported by an affidavit that includes illegally obtained
information, the trial court must determine whether the affidavit established probable cause
after redacting the tainted information. See United States v. Restrepo, 966 F.2d 964,969 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 1049, 113 S.Ct. 968 (1993); see also United States v.
Perez, —F.3d—,Nos. 00-5237,00-5238,00-5261,2002 WL 171241, * 17-18 (3rd Cir. Feb.
4, 2002); United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 692-93 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 528 U.S.
1048, 120 S.Ct. 585 (1999); United States v. Shamaeizadeh, 80 F.3d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir.

1996); United States v. Hogan, 38 F.3d 1148, 1151 (10th Cir. 1994), cert, denied, 514 U.S.
1008, 115 S.Ct. 1323(1995).
Had Officer McNaughton apprised the magistrate of his prior entry and observations,
as the trial court concluded he should have, the warrant would have been subject to a
probable cause challenge under the Franks doctrine. The trial court would have thus been
required to redact the information and determine whether the affidavit established probable
cause without it. Indeed, Officer McNaughton frankly testified that he did not include that
information because he did not want it to form a basis of the probable cause determination.
See R. 195:21 (testifying that he did not include it because he "was not using that as part of
[his] probable cause"). His very concerns that such information might have influenced the
magistrate appear to have been validated when the trial court asked, "You don't think it
would have been helpful for [the magistrate] to know whether or not you had been in there
and actually saw what you wanted the warrant for to determine whether or not you had
sufficient probable cause on the other materials you did tell him about?" R. 195: 21.
* * *

In sum, because the trial court erroneously concluded that Murray required Officer
McNaughton to apprise the magistrate of his initial entry into the storage shed and of his
observation of the clandestine lab, it wrongly discounted his testimony. SeeR. 142-43,16970. As explained above, Murray did not require him to do so to meet his probable cause
burden. Accordingly, failure to disclose that information did not constitute a material
omission. Indeed, the officer's decision to withhold that information appears to have been
21

made to safeguard the probable cause finding. In any event, the omission should not have
been held against him and because the court did so, its finding discounting his testimony is
clearly erroneous.
2.

The Trial Court Improperly Premised Its Finding on the Illegality of
the Initial Entry.

,

The second and subordinate reason offered by the trial court for rejecting Officer
McNaughton's testimony was that the evidence did not justify a protective sweep of the

i

premises. R. 170; R. 178, at ^flf 7-9. In finding that the officer initially entered to verify his
suspicions, the trial court also indicated that it could "recallf ] nothing in the testimony or the
documents that would suggest that there was a 'protective sweep' as a reason of the illegal
entry, or that the officers believed they had a basis to make a 'protective sweep' in the face
of the defendant's objections

" R. 170. The officer, however, never attempted to justify

the entry as a "protective sweep," but simply indicated that he did so for safety reasons. See
R. 195: 13-15, 22-23. Nevertheless, the trial court focused on the legality of the entry,

(

observing that "[t]he search of the storage shed was not a protective sweep, for the protective
sweep doctrine eipplies only when the police are arresting someone inside a home and have
i

a reasonable suspicion that an additional suspect may be lurking nearby and posing a threat
to those on the arrest scene." R. 178, at f 8. Because defendant was simply being detained,
the court concluded "the protective sweep doctrine had no application." R. 178, at ^ 9.

*

The trial court thus further rejected the officer's testimony based on the illegality of
the initial entry. Yet, admissibility of evidence under Murray does not depend on the legality

n
i

of the prior entry—a Murray analysis assumes that the prior entry was unlawful. See, e.g.,
Murray, 487 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 2532 (case assuming that the initial entry was
unlawful); Northrup, 756 P.2d at 1292 (finding the initial entry into the home unlawful).
Here, the State conceded that the initial entry was unlawful and any further analysis by the
court regarding that illegality was therefore irrelevant. See R. 167-68.
The trial court's undue emphasis on the illegality of the search resulted in a clearly
erroneous finding and a remedy disproportionate to the harm. As held by the Utah Supreme
Court in Nielsen, "[d]eterrence of police misconduct is not to be a factor in the decision to
suppress unless the misconduct materially affects the finding of probable cause." Nielsen,
727 P.2d at 191. "'[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the
public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly
balanced by putting police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in
if no police error or misconduct had occurred . . . . ' " Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. at
2533 (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443,104 S.Ct. at 2509). As observed by the Seventh Circuit,
"the exclusionary rule does not require the exclusion of evidence that would have been
obtained lawfully, just in order to punish a search that did not hann the defendant in any
sense relevant to a criminal proceeding . . . . " United States v. Salgado, 807 F.2d 603, 607
(7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1263, 109 S.Ct. 25 (1988). Yet, by placing undue
emphasis on the illegality of the officer's first search here, that is exactly what the trial court
did.

23

To the extent the trial court only meant to indicate that it could recall nothing in the
officer's testimony to suggest safety concerns as a reason for the initial entry, that finding is
against the clear weight of the evidence. See Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, at f 17 n. 2. On direct
examination, Officer McNaughton testified that he entered the storage shed after defendant's
refusal to grant consent because he "felt that there was perhaps a safety issue there, for
myself, and because of the fact that we had information that there was a lab inside, and the
contamination that's associated with that, and the fact that it was possible for the defendant
to go back inside and dispose of chemicals in an unsafe manner."

R. 195: 13-14.

Continuing, Officer McNaughton testified that he and another officer "entered the storage
shed to check for other people inside, that may be a threat to us." R. 195: 14. Later, on
examination of the trial court, Officer McNaughton testified that he entered before getting
a warrant for safety reasons, explaining that he "wanted to check for other people inside the
storage facility." R. 195:22.
Although Officer McNaughton conceded that he had no specific information
indicating that other persons were involved, R. 195: 22, his safety concerns were more than
justified. Officer McNaughton testified that in his experience, "there are commonly other
people inside" where drugs are being manufactured. R. 195:23. He testified that "[i]t is not
uncommon to find weapons associated with people, other things to protect their business or
their trade." R. 195:23. In other words, this was not a simple possession case, but rather one
involving the suspected manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine. Defendant was
thus suspected of a crime that, by its very nature, suggested a high risk of danger to officers.
24

Cf. State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346,1 15, 37 P.3d 270 (holding that dealing in large
quantities of narcotics is a crime that, by its nature, suggests the presence of weapons).
Moreover, Officer McNaughton's apprehensions concerning the improper or unsafe
disposal of the chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were also warranted.
'The dangers associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine are well known." United
States v. D'Armond, 80 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1168 (D. Kan. 1999). The manufacture of
methamphetamine requires the use of "dangerously toxic chemicals" and poses a "serious
health risk" to those in the vicinity. Id, (citations omitted). These inherent dangers have
prompted federal sentencing guidelines that enhance the sentence of any operator of a
methamphetamine lab which is shown to create a substantial risk of harm to human life or
the environment. See United States v. Dick, 173 F.Supp.2d 765, 769-70 (E.D. Tenn. 2001).
The risk posed by methamphetamine labs have also prompted some courts to uphold
warrantless searches of premises suspected of housing the labs under the exigent
circumstances exception. See, e.g., United States v. Erb, 596 F.2d 412 (10th Cir.) (holding
that hazards posed by methamphetamine lab on premises contributed to justifiable
warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 848, 100 S.Ct. 97
(1979); United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that risk of
explosion of a methamphetamine lab in operation presented an exigent circumstance that
would have justified an immediate warrantless search), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1100,104 S.Ct.
1593(1984).
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In sum, the trial court improperly focused on the illegality of the initial entry, which
was conceded by the State, disregarding the officer's testimony and the legitimate safety
concerns associated with the pursuit of those engaged in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. The trial court's dismissal of Officer McNaughton's testimony as

*

spurious was thus clearly erroneous.
B.

No INFORMATION FROM THE INITIAL ENTRY WAS RELIED ON IN THE MAGISTRATE 'S
DECISION TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANT.

'

The second inquiry under Murray is whether any of the information learned from the
initial police entry affected the magistrate's decision to issue the search warrant. See
Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 2534; May, 214 F.3d at 906. A review of the search
warrant affidavit here reveals that it did not.
i

The search warrant affidavit cited only two circumstances as support for a finding of
probable cause. First, the affidavit advised the magistrate that two confidential informants,
both of whom had previously provided police with reliable information, told police they had

<

personally observed a working methamphetamine lab in unit 16 of the Midvale storage
facility. R. 162-63, 165. Second, the affidavit explained that a sniff search by a trained K-9
unit confirmed the presence of narcotics in unit 16 on the very day police sought the warrant.
R. 163-64. The search warrant affidavit did not include any information indicating that
i

police had personally observed a methamphetamine lab in the shed, nor was any of the
information in the affidavit obtained as a result of the initial police entry. See R. 160-66. As
Officer McNaughton explained at the suppression hearing, he did not include that

{
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information because he "was not using that as part of [his] probable cause" showing. R.
195:21.
Accordingly, where no information from the initial entry was included in the search
warrant affidavit, it did not affect the magistrate's decision to grant the search warrant. See
Murray, 487 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. at 2534. The trial court did not find otherwise.
* # #

In summary, where the trial court based its finding on an erroneous understanding of
the law, and where the circumstances surrounding the search of a methamphetamine lab are
inherently dangerous, the trial court's finding that Officer McNaughton entered the premises
simply to verify his suspicions was clearly erroneous.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the trial
court's order suppressing the evidence and remand the case for trial.
Respectfully submitted this \Sh day of March, 2002.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO. 991922816

Plaintiff,
' TB

'

• -

RANDY PETER KRUKOWSKI,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on September 22,
2000, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Suppress.

The

prosecutioi i el i cited testimony from Detective Michael McNaughton.
Following

Detective

McNaughton1s

testimony,

the

Court

heard

argument from counsel and took the matter under advisement to
consider the law in 1 igl it of the facts

The Court also granted

leave to the defense to file supplemental memoranda by October 13,
2000.

The State was given leave to respond

by October 27, 2000.

Having now reviewed the movinnj -indl responding memoranda, as well as
the

supplemental

pleadings

filed

by

both

sides,

and

having

reflected upon the law and argument from counsel, the Court rules
as stated herein.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The
hearing,

following

facts were elicited

during the

suppression

Detective McNaughton was informed about two confidential
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informants who had witnessed the operation of a methamphetamine
laboratory inside unit #16 of the Midvale Self Storage facility.
According to the informants, they had observed an individual named
"Randy Kawalski" manufacturing the methamphetamine.
After receiving this information, Detective McNaughton, along
with other officers, drove to the Storage Facility.

The officers

observed a truck parked near unit #16, registered to the defendant.
The "man door" to this unit was slightly ajar.
Detective McNaughton then summoned a Murray City Police K-9
handler, Officer Hanson, and his police service dog, Django. Upon
their arrival, Officer Hanson guided Django along units #15 to #18.
Django indicated the presence of narcotics in front of the man door
to unit #15. However, Officer Hanson apparently discerned from the
dog's actions and the way that the wind was blowing that the
narcotics were in fact in unit #16.
The officers approached unit #16 and knocked on the door. The
defendant came to the door and stepped outside, shutting the door
behind him.

The officers asked the defendant who he was and

informed him that they had received information about drugs being
manufactured in the storage unit.

The officers then requested

permission to go inside the storage unit.

The defendant declined

when he was informed that the officers did not have a search
warrant.
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Detective McNaughton testified that it was then decided to
enter the unit anyhow to do a "protective sweep."

The State has

since conceded, that "off j cers' warrantless entry of the defendant's
storage unit, for the purposes of conducting a protective sweep,
was

illegal."

(State's

Response

to

Defense's

Supplemental

Memorandum at p. 1 ) . There are no facts to justify a protective
sweep.
After entering the storage unit, the officers observed what
appeared, tc 1 -

andestine methamphetamine 1 ab.

turned the power off to unit #16 and briefly
defendant.

The officers

interviewed

the

The defendant remained with other officers at the

storage ui lit while Detective McNaughton ] eft the storage unit to
prepare a search warrant application.
In reviewing the search warrant affidavit, there is clearly no
mention that the officers had already entered storage unit #16 and
observed the drug manufacturing

items.

When asked about this

omission, Detective McNaughton informed the Court that he did not
think the magistrate who would be review,,:! i ig the search warrant
affidavit needed to know that the officers had already gained entry
and searched the storage unit before obtaining a search warrant.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The defendant contends that the officers' failure to inform
the magistrate that they had observed the drug manufacturing items
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after gaining illegal entry into the storage unit, invalidates the

<

search warrant under Franks v, Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978).
The State counters that the search warrant in this case is valid
because it included only the information obtained prior to the
officer's entry into the storage unit.

i

Therefore, the State

contends that while the evidence in this case may have been seized
after the officers' illegal entry into the storage unit, it was

(

nonetheless seized pursuant to a valid search warrant "which was
based upon information from a source independent of the illegal
entry."

State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Utah Ct. App.

1988) (discussing Seaura v. United States. 468 U.S. 796 (1984)).
Since the State has advanced an "inevitable discovery" theory,
the analysis of the defendant's Motion to Suppress necessarily
begins with

Sequra.

In that

case, drug

enforcement

agents

illegally entered and secured Segura's apartment while waiting for
a search warrant to be obtained.

In determining whether the

illegality of the initial entry required suppression of evidence
later obtained under a valid warrant, the United States Supreme
Court held: "Whether the initial entry was illegal or not is
irrelevant to the admissibility of the challenged evidence because
there was an independent source for the warrant under which that
evidence was seized."
information

obtained

Seaura, 468 U.S. at 813-14.
during

the

initial

illegal

Since no
entry

and

4
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occupation of the apartment was used by the agents to secure the
warrant (because the agents possessed information that Segura was
trafficking cocai ne even before they entered the apartment), the
warrant

was determined

to have

been

based

on

a source of

information independent from the unlawful conduct. Id. at 814.
The Utah Court :)f Appeal s in State v. Northrup. 756 P. 2d 1288
(Utah App. 1988), interpreted

Segura and its application to

evidence that is observed in plain view during the initial illegal
entry.

In that case, the cour t re iter ated the predomi nant view

that Seaura requires a two-step analysis: (1) whether "the evidence
is seized pursuant

valid search warrant; and (2) if the

warrant is based upon information truim a source i ndependent of
illegal entry."

Id. at 1292.

It is interesting to note, that

neither Segura nor Northrup address the first step of this inquiry,
the validity of the search warrant, because \ ml i ke the present
defendant, neither Segura nor Northrup challenged the validity of
the search warrant.
is whethei

(Segura, 468 U.S. at 804 ("The only issue here

drugs and the other items not observed during the

initial entry and first discovered by the agents the day after the
entry, under an admittedly valid search warrant, should have been
suppressed.")

(emphasis

added);

Northrup,

756

P.2d

at 1292

("Northrup's attorney stated during oral argument that he did not
challenge the search warrant on appeal. In addition, the affidavit
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which served as the basis of the warrant is not part of the record
on appeal.11) .
As discussed above, the defendant in this case does challenge
the

validity

McNaughton.

of

the

According

search

warrant

obtained

to the defendant,

by

Detective

the search warrant

affidavit on which the warrant is based is defective because it
omits any information concerning the officers having already gained
illegal entry into the storage unit.

In support of this argument,

the defendant relies on Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 165
(1978) .
In Franks. the United States Supreme Court held that an
affidavit
presumed

submitted in support of a search warrant application is
valid.

Franks. 438 U.S. at

171.

However,

that

presumption may be overcome by a showing that the affidavit
contains a '"false statement [made] knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth," Id. at 155.

The Utah

Supreme Court in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986),
extended the Franks doctrine to include a misstatement which occurs
because

information

has been omitted.

Since Nielsen, other

jurisdictions have joined in holding that
statements" that

"have

been

rendered

omissions" are similarly problematic.
Scalia. 993 F.2d 984, 987 (lsC

"technically accurate

misleading

See e.g.

Cir. 1993).

by material

United States v.
If such a false
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statement or material omission is present in a search warrant
affidavit and "the affidavit fails to support a finding of probable
cause after the false statements are excised or the omitted
information

is added,

i.e.

if

the omission

or

misstatement

materially affects the finding of probable cause, any evidence
obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be suppressed."
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 190 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 156) (emphasis
added).

The defendant contends that under Franks, the officer's

failure to mention the illegal entry constitutes a material
omission which affected the finding of probable cause and which
resulted in an improperly issued warrant.
The issue of whether an officer must inform the magistrate of
a prior illegal entry in the search warrant affidavit and whether
the failure to do so invalidates the resulting search warrant is an
issue of first impression in Utah.

However, the First Circuit

Court of Appeals dealt with this precise issue in the case of
United States v. Moscatiello. 771 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1985), vacated
on other grounds (476 U.S. 1138 (1986)).
In Moscatiello. the defendants

argued

that

because the

application for the warrant failed to mention the prior illegal
entry, the warrant was tainted by that prior illegality. The court
held that under Franks, "absent fabrication of evidence, . . . the
mere omission of irrelevant facts from an affidavit constitutes no
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reason to suppress the warrant. The omission did not "enhance the
contents

of the affidavit,• nor deceive the magistrate into

granting a warrant he would otherwise not have issued . . ."

Id.

at 603 (internal citations omitted).
Three years after the Mos

tiello decision, the United States

Supreme Court decided the case of Murray v. United States, 487 U.S.
533 (1988).

Notably, Murray concerned two separate petitions of

defendants that had been involved in the Moscatiello case.

In the

Murray decision, the Supreme Court noted the First Circuit Court's
holding that the officers' omission was irrelevant, but did not
review this decision.

Instead, the Supreme Court focused strictly

on the scope of the "independent source" doctrine and whether it
applied

to

evidence

initially

discovered

during,

or

as

a

consequence of, an unlawful search (i.e. where the evidence was in
plain view during the unlawful search).
The Murray case involved several law enforcement agents who
had conducted an illegal search and observed but did not seize
evidence that was in plain view. After the initial illegal entry,
the agents obtained a warrant to search the warehouse where the
evidence was located.

Pursuant to the warrant, the agents seized

the evidence they had observed earlier. The defendants argued that
the

"asserted policy basis for excluding evidence which is

initially discovered during an illegal search, but is subsequently

i
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acquired through an independent and lawful source, is that a
contrary rule will remove all deterrence to, and indeed positively
encourage, unlawful police searches." Id. at 538. The defendants
argued that law enforcement officers would have an incentive to
"routinely enter without a warrant to make sure that what they
expect to be on the premises is in fact there.

If it is not, they

will have spared themselves the time and trouble of getting a
warrant; if it is, they can get the warrant and use the evidence
despite the unlawful entry."

Id.

The Court stated that it viewed the incentives differently:
An officer with probable cause sufficient to
obtain a search warrant would be foolish to
enter the premises first in an unlawful
manner.
By doing so, he would risk
suppression of all evidence on the premises,
both seen and unseen, since his action would
add to the normal burden of
convincing a
magistrate that there is probable cause the
much more onerous burden of convincing a trial
court that no information gained from the
illegal entry affected
either the law
enforcement officers9 decision to seek a
warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant
it. Nor would the officer without sufficient
probable cause to obtain a search warrant have
any added incentive to conduct an unlawful
entry, since whatever he finds cannot be used
to
establish
probable
cause
before a
magistrate.
Id. (Emphasis added).
This Court interprets this language to require an officer to
inform a magistrate of the prior illegal entry in order to meet the

. . I*V
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heightened burden of convincing the magistrate that whatever was
found during that initial illegal entry was not used to establish
probable cause.

In other words, in light of the Supreme Court's

reasoning in MurrayP the magistrate is placed in the position of
making a neutral and objective assessment of whether the officers
truly did not rely on the evidence found during the illegal entry
and whether they have proven this point under the heightened burden
imposed because of the illegal entry.

A magistrate who is not

informed of the illegal entry would have no way of making this
assessment and would, in fact, be applying a lesser burden than
required under Murray.
the

process

Clearly, such a result would run afoul of

contemplated

by

the

Supreme

Court

in

Murray.

Furthermore, since the illegal entry increases the officers' burden
of proof, information of such entry would not be "irrelevant," as
characterized by the Moscatiello court.

To the contrary, the

failure to inform the magistrate clearly affects the finding of
probable cause and therefore amounts to a material omission under
Franks.

Accordingly, any evidence obtained under the search

warrant resulting from the improper affidavit must be suppressed.
The defendant's Motion is therefore granted.
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Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an Order consistent
with this Memorandum Decision and submjrc the same to the Court for
review and signature.
Dated this ' S day of December, 2000.

&±tt
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IN TBI DISTRICT COURT OF TBI THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AMD FOR SALT LAM COUNTY, 8TATI OF UTAH

STATE 07 UTAH,
Plaintiff,
VS.

RANDY PBTKR KRUKOWSKX,
Defendant.

The Court has before

I
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Third Judicial District

S

JUN 1 t 2001
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t

It proposed

rSff¥^jj^

Plndings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law prepared by counsel for the defendant granting
the defendant's Notion to Suppress. The Court also has the State's
Reply to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
which sets forth a number of objections and suggestions offered by
the State. The Court having reviewed both documents, is satisfied
that it can sign the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
prepared by the defendant as proposed.

The Court overrules the

objections submitted by the State.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court is of the opinion that
a number of the objections merely go to a selection of words chosen
by the defendant to include in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law to which the State objects.

For example, the objection to

Findings of Fact 3, Hforced their way into," is offensive to the
State. The State stipulated that the officers conducted an illegal

1
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The evidence is that the defendant, occupier of the

premises in question, told the officers they may not enter his
storage shed without a proper warrant.

The Court recalls no

testimony from anyone that would suggest that the officers told the
defendant that they were entering the premises to conduct a
••protective sweep." As the entry into the premises was without the
acquiescence of the defendant, it was "forced." The State seems to
equate the word "force" with some type of physical action to remove
the defendant from in front of the door.

That is not required.

The wording as proposed is proper and properly characterizes the
nature of the entry in this case, even in the face of the State's
stipulation that the entry was illegal.
On that same issue, the State objects to the words in Findings
of Fact 4(e), "apparently discerned." Officer Hanson, the handler
of the dog, did not testify and his statements, conclusions or
opinions

were

received

through

the

testimony

of

Detective

McNaughton. The wording is appropriate to set forth what Detective
McNaughton had reportedly been advised by Officer Hanson.
The State further objects to the term "manufacturing" in
Finding of Fact 4(g). The Court has no independent recollection as
to whether or not Detective McNaughton told the defendant that he
was suspected of "drug activity," as opposed to "manufacturing."
The

statement

is without

any

real

significance, as clearly

PAGE 3
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conveyed
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to the defendant

suspected of some type of drug activity.

that

he was

The Court will make the

pen-and-ink change, with the understanding that the State has
referred to the transcript of the proceedings and the words used by
Detective McNaughton were, in fact, "drug activity."
The State objects to the statements that this Court determines
that Detective McNaughton would not have obtained a search warrant
but for the illegal forced entry.

Whether or not that was

specifically referred to in the Court1s Memorandum Decision, that
Decision was only designed to be a summary of the Court's views on
this matter, it is appropriate to include the same, as the Court is
satisfied that the State has not shown that the search warrant
would have been obtained but for the fact that Detective McNaughton
performed a constitutionally invalid search of the premises before
obtaining the warrant. If Detective McNaughton thought that he had
a sufficient basis to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal entry
over the objections of the defendant, he could have made that
attempt.

Detective McNaughton apparently chose to violate the

defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an illegal search
to satisfy himself that there was a basis to go to the effort to
obtain a search warrant.
Based upon the fact that Detective McNaughton did not advise
Judge Medley of the fact that he had made an illegal entry into the

i
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defendant's premises, and did in fact ascertain that there was drug
manufacturing in the defendant's premises when he was presenting
information to Judge Medley for issuance of a warrant, this Court
has little confidence in the testimony of Detective McNaughton on
this issue.

The Court recalls nothing in the testimony or the

documents that would suggest that there was a Hprotective sweep" as
a reason for the illegal entry, or that the officers believed they
had a basis to make a "protective sweep" in the face of the
defendant's objections to entering his premises without a warrant
at any time prior to the defendant calling the search into
question.

This Court is unable to find that Defective McNaughton

and his fellow officers at the time of the illegal search intended
to rely upon the concept of a "protective sweep" in entering the
defendant's premises without a warrant. Rather, the conclusion was
reached as an attempt to justify the search after it was called
into question.

The

Court

is not

satisfied

that

Detective

McNaughton was merely mistaken regarding a "protective sweep," and
while the term "orchestrate" may overly state the Court's position,
there are serious questions regarding this entire search and the
reasons given for it. Detective McNaughton's statement to this
Court when the question was asked as to why he did not tell Judge
Medley that he had been in the building without a warrant and
determined that there was in fact methamphetamine production going

STATE V. KRUKOWSKI
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on, Detective Mcffeughton responded to the effect that he did not
think. Judge Medley needed to know that.

If officers obtaining

warrants- are the final arbitrators on what a magistrate issuing a
warrant needs to know to conduct a proper evaluation as to whether
a warrant ought to be issued, the concept of obtaining a warrant
from a judge is meaningless.
In view of the surrounding circumstances, and the statements
of Detective HcNaughton, the Court determines that the words
"orchestrate1* will remain.
The remaining portions of the State's objections, even though
not specifically addressed, are without merit.

Finally, to the

extent: that the State objects that this Court decides the matter
under the Pranks doctrine, that objection is equally misplaced.
This Court evaluates the propriety of the issuance of the search
warrant, the conduct of the officers preceding thereto, and the
quality of their testimony thereafter, to determine whether or not
a constitutional violation occurred, whether or not counsel address
the issues in their legal arguments, or otherwise.

(
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The Court has on a date contemporaneous with the date of this
Minute Entry decision signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Lav granting the Motion to Suppress as submitted.
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
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day of June,

2001:
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Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff
348 E. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Stephen R. McCaughey
Attorney for Defendant
10 W. Broadway, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,

v.

RANDY PETER KRUKOWSKI,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 991922816FS

:

Judge Timothy Hanson

:

The defendant has filed a multi-faceted challenge to the search warrant issued
in his case, and after having taken evidence and considered the positions of the parties
set forth in oral argument and various memoranda, the Court grants the motion to
suppress on the grounds that Detective McNaughton's failure to inform the magistrate
in the search warrant affidavit of the officers' unlawful entry into the storage shed
violated the Franks doctrine and that Detective McNaughton would not have sought
a warrant absent his prior entry into the shed.
Because this ruling is dispositive of the motion to suppress, the Court does not
reach any other issue raised by the defendant.

In support of the order granting the motion to suppress, the Court now makes
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On October 26, 1999, the police searched a storage shed pursuant to a
nighttime search warrant issued by Third District Court Judge Tyrone E. Medley, acting
as magistrate.
2. The search warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit signed by Detective
Mike McNaughton of the South Salt Lake City Police Department, and DEA Metro
Narcotics Task Force.
3. The affidavit in support of the warrant did not inform the magistrate that
prior to approaching Judge Medley for a warrant, the police forced their way into the
storage unit and found a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory.
4. The following specific events transpired prior to the drafting of the search
warrant affidavit:
a. Detective McNaughton was informed about t w o confidential informants who
had witnessed a person named "Randy Kawalski" operating a methamphetamine
laboratory inside unit #16 of the Midvale Self Storage facility.
b. After receiving this information, Detective McNaughton and other officers
drove to the storage facility, and found a truck registered to the defendant, Randy
Krukowski, parked outside storage unit #16, which had its "man door" slightly ajar.

i

c. Detective McNaughton summoned Murray City Police K-9 handler, Officer
Hanson, who ran his police service dog, Django, along units 15 through 18 of the
storage unit.
d. Django indicated the presence of narcotics in front of the man door to unit
15.
e. Based on the dog's alert and the way the wind was blowing, Officer Hanson
apparently discerned that the narcotics were actually in unit # 1 6 .
f. The officers approached unit #16 and knocked on the door, and Krukowski
came outside and shut the man door behind himself.
g. The officers asked Krukowski who he was and informed him of their
A c r / V f ? ^ - "**
suspicions about drug wonufaoturing in unit # 1 6 .
h. The officers asked Krukowski's permission to search the unit, but he refused
permission upon learning that they had no warrant.
i. The police then forced their way into the unit without lawful justification.
j . McNaughton attempted to characterize the entry as a "protective sweep," but
the State has correctly conceded that there was no protective sweep.
k.

After

entering the storage unit,

the police observed

a clandestine

methamphetamine lab.
I. The police turned off the power to unit # 16 and detained and interviewed
Krukowski while McNaughton obtained a search warrant.

3

1

5. The search warrant affidavit makes no mention of the unlawful entry by the
police or of their having found the clandestine laboratory.
6.

,

The officer would not have sought a search warrant but for his illegal

observations of the inside of the storage area.
In light of the foregoing findings of fact, the Court hereby makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the 'right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures/" United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 3 5 9 , 362 (10th Cir. 1989).
3. Article I §14 of the Utah Constitution provides protection at least as broad
as the Fourth Amendment, and is at times construed to provide broader protection.
See State v. Larocco, 7 9 4 P.2d 4 6 0 (Utah 1990)(plurality).

See also State v.

Thompson, 8 1 0 P.2d 4 1 5 , 4 1 8 (Utah 1991)(recognizing privacy interest in bank
records under Article I section 14).
4. Because it appears that Fourth Amendment law provides ample bases for
suppression, this Court will utilize the primacy approach, addressing only the federal
constitutional law.

•
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5. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 1 54 (1 978), the Court held that when the
police knowingly or recklessly include material misstatements in a search warrant
affidavit which misstatements are essential to probable cause for the warrant,
suppression is in order.

See id. at 171-72.

6. Under the Franks doctrine, an officer is likewise forbidden to mislead by
omission -- when facts undermining probable cause are missing from a search warrant
affidavit, suppression is in order.

See e.g. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191

(Utah), cert, denied, 4 8 0 U.S. 930 (1987).
7. In the instant matter, the search warrant affiant did not inform the magistrate
that the police had orchestrated an unlawful search of the storage shed at issue, and
dishonestly labeled it a "protective sweep," just prior to approaching the magistrate
for a warrant.
8. The search of the storage shed was not a

protective sweep, for the

protective sweep doctrine applies only when the police are arresting someone inside
a home and have a reasonable suspicion that an additional suspect may be lurking
nearby and posing a threat to those on the arrest scene. See e.g. Maryland v. Buie,
4 9 4 U.S. 325, 336 (1990).
9. In the instant matter, Mr. Krukowski was being "detained" outside a closed
storage shed, and the protective sweep doctrine had no application. See id;
United States v. Hooan. 38 F.3d 1148, 1150 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1008
(1995).

5

10. The Court finds that this omission was material and clearly affected the
finding of probable cause, requiring suppression under Franks.
1 1 . The Court is not persuaded that the independent source doctrine discussed
in Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988), applies to the facts of this case.
1 2. Under Murray, the government bears the burden to establish that the police
were not prompted to obtain a warrant by what they found in the unlawful search, but
would have sought a warrant on the basis of what they knew prior to entering the
shed.

See ijd. at 538 "By doing so [conducting an unlawful search], he would risk

suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen and unseen, since his action
would add to the normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable
cause the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no information
gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers' decision to
seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant it.")(emphasis added), and Murray
at 542 (independent source doctrine does not apply if officer's decision to seek a
warrant was prompted by what they saw in warrantless search).
1 3. The record does not persuade the Court that Detective McNaughton would
have sought a warrant without first entering the storage shed, but demonstrates that
the reason that Detective McNaughton entered the storage shed initially was to
investigate the case further before deciding whether to seek a warrant.
14. The basis for the officer obtaining a warrant was his illegal entrance into
the shed.

6

15. It was a material omission not making the court aware of the prior entry
of the place to be searched in the affidavit.
16. Given the absence of proof of an independent source under Murray, and
given the Franks violation, the Court concludes that£he motion to suppress should be

BRENDA BEATON
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH

ss

450 South State St
^ZuP.ESS

i-, lececoive Xike Mc*rau~hccn of ohe IZA Mecro
c e m g :;r33 cu_y sworn, zecoses and says he has

(X)
ON THE PREMISES KNOWN AS MIDVALE SZLF STORAGE, STORAGE
STiZD #15. FURTHER DESCRIBED AS A STORAGE SHED FACILITY WITH AN
ADD31SSS OF 111 SOUTH ALLEN STREET, MIDVALE, UTAH. THE STORAGE FACILITY
IS LOCATED ON THE EAST SIDE OF ALLEN STREET. STORAGE UNIT #1S IS
LOCATED ON THE NORTHERN SIDE OF A STORAGE S7ZD COMPLEX THAT RUNS NORTH
AND SOUTH. STORAGE S"dZD #15 HAS A GREEN COLORED OVERHEAD TYPE DOOR
WITH A GREEN COLORED MAN DOOR LOCATED JUST SOUTH OF THE OVERHEAD DOOR.
THE NUM3ER 16, SILVER IN COLOR, IS LOCATED DIRECTLY ABOVE THE MAN
DOOR. THE ST03AGS S^ZD FACES WEST;
TO INCLUDE ALL CONTAINERS, GARBAGE CANS, OR SIMILAR AREAS THAT CAN BE
USED FOR STORAGE OR CONCEALMENT CONTAINED THEREIN.
and in ohe Ccuncv cz Sal.™ LaJ-ce Seals of Utah
orccercv or evidence described as:

chere is now csrtstin

(SEE ATTACHMENT A)
iao said property cr evidence:
(M; was unlawfully accuired or is 'unlawfully possessed,
or
(X; has been used zo cccor.ic or conceal a public offense, or
(X; is being possessed
with one purpose oo use io as a near.s of
cc.Tjr.iocine or concealing a public offense, or
(X) ccr.siscs of an ioem or constitutes evidence of illecal

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT/
SEARCH WARRANT

ATTACHMENT "A"
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
1. GLASSWARE, 70 INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO ROUND AND FLAT BOTTOM
BILLING FLASK, FUNNELS, CONDENSER COLUMNS, SINGLE, DOUBLE AND
TRIPLE NECK FLASKS, C077EZ POTS, STIRRING RODS, SEPARATORY
2. HEATING MANTLES, PORTABLE ELECTRIC AND GAS STOVES.
2.STORAGE CONTAINERS TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, GAS CANS,
CHEMICAL BOTTLES PLASTIC, GLASS, FIBER, ?.-.?ZR, CARDBOARD AND
PLASTIC.
4.

TUBING TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, REINFORCED SYNTHETIC

A_ND GLASS, GARDEN

y.oszs.

5. RUBBER STOPPERS, LUBRICANTS AND SZ^LZP.S USED WITH STOPPERS
INCLUDING DUCT TAPS AND ELECTRICAL TAPE.
5. CKZy.ZC?.LS INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, EPHEDRINE,
PSEUDCEPHEDRINE, IODINE, PHOSPHOROUS, LYE, ACIDS AND SOLVENTS
USED IN THE MANUFACTURING 0? METHAMPHETAMIN-Z.
7. METHAMPHETAMINE, A SYNTHETIC SCHEDULE 2 STIMULANT IN ROCK,
POWDER OR LIQUID FORMS.
3. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO PLASTIC
BAGS, TAPE, 7.-.^Z?. 3INDLES CUT INTO SQUAP.E3, SC^ZS AND MATERIAL
USED ^0 CUT OR DILUTE MSTHAMPHSTAMINZ.
9. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE 3UT NOT LIMITED TO SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON 3ALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING OR TUBES FOR INHALING METHIAMPHETAMINZ.
10. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR 3ILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
11. U.S. CURRENCY 3SLIZVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE
NARCOTICS BEING 5EAR.CHED FOR, AND ANY AND ALL ITEMS DETERMINED TO
BE COLLATERAL OR ??:0CZZDS FROM NARCOTICS TRANSACTIONS.
12. NARCOTIC RECORDS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO PRICE LISTS,
--MOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, FINANCIAL GAIN AND
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Your Affiant believes the property and evidence described above
is evidence of the crime(s) of:
Possession of a Con-rolled Substance, Possession of a Controlled
Substance and Manufacture of a controlled substance.
Your affiant, Detective Mike McNaughcon, is employed by u*iS
South Salt Lake City Police Department and is currently assigned to
the DEA Metro Narcotics Task Jcroe. Your affiant has beer, given the
responsibility to investigate controlled substance distribution,
possession and manufacturing offenses occurring in Salt Lake County
and surrounding areas.
Your affiant has training in'controlled substance (s)
identification and the investigation cf controlled substance related
offenses. Your affiant is a Certified Peace Officer in the State of
Ytah, and has S years cf law enforcement experience. Your affiant has
been assigned to narcotics investigations since October 1955, and has
beer, assigned to DEA Metro Narcotics Task Force since that time. Your
affiant has assisted in investigations of various controlled substance
distribution operations. Your affiant's specialized training includes
:?:
Officers Standards and Training. Your affiant has
training in
is training
Specialized Drug Recognition and Clandestine Laboratories
Investigations. Your affiant has completed the Clandestine Laboratory
Enforcement Team school from DEA and is a certified member. Your
affiant has also attended The DEA Basic Narcotic Officers School. Your
affiant has completed the Cannabis Detection and Eradication school
sponsored by the DEA and the Utah Department of Public Safety,
Criminal Investigation 3ureau. Your affiant has supervised controlled
buys and has completed numerous hand to hand narcotics buys. Your
affiant has assisted in the investigation, and investigated narcotics
cases through controlled buys of narcotics, surveillance of suspected
drug sales operations, interrogation of sus^oeczs and informants and
investigating intelligence reports received from citizens.
Your affiant is currently investigating a complaint relating to
an ongoing controlled substance distribution and manufacturing
operation being conducted at the named premises en this
//arrant/Affidavit.
The facts to establish grrotinds for a search warrant are:
1

Your affiant has received information from two confidential
informants stating that he/she believes that an individual is engaged
in the distribution and manufacture of controlled substances from the
named premises. Your affiant has been supplied with the following
information from the sources.

i /
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.vitnin tr.e -as: sever, cays Special Agent Keith Clscr. has spoken
to the confidential informants (hereafter referred to as CI#1 and CI
= 2). The CIs ^supplied A g e " Clson with ;:.:ormation concerning
naroooio manufacturing from one listed address. The CIs informed Agent
Clson that he s'r.a had cean inside the storage unit named on this
affidavit/warrant and that he/she observed a me thamphet amine
laboratory and
.tiethamphetamine
inside the storage unit.
_
_
*-~ ^ - 5
s-ateu
-r.^:: r.andy XA///A.L5XI leased the listed storage unit and that he
a *•
manufactures methamphetamine there. 3oth CIs stated that they have
observed Randy KAWA1SXI manufacturing methamphetamine at the location.
AS*

Cn October 25, 1999 your affiant went to the listed storage
facility and observed a red colored Nissan truck parked in front of
the listed storage -unit. Your affiant did a registration check on the
truck and learned that the truck was registered to Randy Xrukowski.
Arrangements were made on October 25, 1999 to have a police dog
trained in the detection of narcotics, check the perimeter of the
storage -unit on this Warrant/.Af f idavit for the presence of narcotics
inside the storage unit.
On October 25, 1999 your affiant along with other narcotic agents
and police officers had a police service dog, hereafter referred to as
?S2 django taken to the storage unit on this Warrant/Affidavit. PSD
Django along with K-9 handler Kevin Hanson walked by a total of four
storage units. As Officer Hanson and Django walkec by storage unit
-15, Officer Hanson purposely guided Django away from unit #15 due to
the man door being slightly ajar. .As Officer Hanson cleared the
doorway of unit #15 he again allowed Django to smell the storage
units."Django hit on the area immediately South of unit #15. Che wind
was blowing from the South toward the slightly open door of 'unit #15.
Django indicated the presence of narcotics from 'under the doorway of
unic~#13. Officer Hanson indicated to your affiant that the wind was
blowing into the slightly open door of -unit #15 and going into unit
=15 then circling around to unit #13 where it was coming cut from
-under the door. This observation is based on Officer Hanson's training
and experience.
Your affiant knocked on the man door of unit #15 and spoke to a
white male who sze-c'ped outside the storage unit and immediately clcsed
the door behind him. Your affiant asked the male if his name was Randy
and was told ves.

> Canine Expertise Statement
D;angc is a 2 1/2 year eld Belgian Mai. Who began service with
the Murray City Police Cepartment or. December 13, 1993 with handler
^-- —-»-- -.— /—— ..»*.aw**. w.,—^«J -.—.o ^„.._ w.„_.*s-.*-.. w-s—.—..3 ai«. w..e ucan
police Academy and was certified in narcotics detection. Django has
had approximately 700-303 total hours m narcotics detection. Officer
Hanson and Orange train every day and train in detection of narcotics
4 to 5 days a week
Cccicer Hanson has three vears cf law enforcement e"cc,a'M"'' ^^c a as a
Murray Police Officer.
O;ango has done a total of 9 3 drug searches during the past eight
months with 33 drug finds. Ojango has done a total cf sever, narcotic
searches
on storage sheds with 5 narcotic finds.
v
Items to be seized:
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for
mechamphecamine and U.S. currency because your affiant's training and
experience has shewn it is very common for s^szeczs
of narcotics
offenses to keep related evidence in their premises. Your affiant
knows from training and experience that distributors of narcotics do
so for financial gain and that quantities of U.S. Currency are found
wnere narcot cs searcn warrants are servec For reasons mciucec m
this affidav t your affiant believes the storage unit is being used as
a drug distribution anc manufacturing center.
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for
packaging material, paraphernalia, clandestine laboratory equipment
and records of controlled substances. Your affiant knows from training
and experience that packaging material and clandestine laboratory
equipment are an inherent part of controlled substance distribution
and manufacturing operations and are needed to maintain an ongoing
enterprise, as the substance must be manufactured, and must always
leave the premises in a container of some kind. Your affiant knows
from training and experience that narcotics paraphernalia is
consistently found where controlled substance search warrants are
served. Your affiant knows from the past execution of numerous
controlled substance search warrants that s'j.s^eczs
often keez records
to show dates, times, amounts purchased, who purchased, financial gain
and drug indebtedness. Your affiant also believes the premises should
be searched for lease records and ownership records of the named
premises. Also these items are consistently found during the execution
of narcotics search warrants.

.; .1

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
PAGE 4
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential
informant reliable because:
*

The CIs have given their full names, date of birth, and address
to your affiant. The CIs are not suspects in this investigation. CIT2
is employed. The CI volunteered the information to law enforcement
officers.
CI#2 has provided the investigators on this case information
that has led to the seizure of three clandestine methamphetamine
laboratories within the last fifteen days.
3oth CIs have provided a substantial amount of drug trafficking
and manufacturing intelligence to the greater Salt Lake area, which
have ben verified as true and accurate. ^
Your affiant asks the Court not to require the revelation of the
name of the CI for fear of physical retaliation by the suspect(s).
Threats of physical harm against individuals thought to be
confidential informants are commonplace.
Your affiant has had this Warrant/Affidavit reviewed by Assistant
Attorney General Gary Heward and the warrant affidavit as been
aooroved for presentation to the court.
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WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that the search warrant be issued for the
saizure of said items; immediately due to the storage shed having be*secured by officers while the warrant is prepared.
()

In the daytime.

(X)
At anytime day or night because there is good reason
to believe it necessary to seize property prior to it being concealed,
damaged, destroyed or altered, or for other good reasons to-wit.

^
^
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JUZCl IN THE THIRD DISTRICT/COURT/
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF S^LT LAKE,
STATS OF UTAH.
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